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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

CONSISTENTLY REVEALING THE INCONSISTENCIES: THE
CONSTRUCTION OF FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL LAW

CAMILLE A. NELSON*

I. INTRODUCTION
Borne out of wonder, awe and optimism, I am fascinated with the law.
One must remain optimistic if one is to believe in the power of the law to
shape society for the better. Loss of faith in the law as a powerful tool for the
equitable management of society eliminates avenues for peaceful social change
and has a potentially destabilizing effect on society. As Felix Frankfurter
famously stated, “[F]ragile as reason is and limited as law is as the . . .
institutionalized medium of reason, that’s all we have standing between us and
the tyranny of mere will and the cruelty of unbridled, undisciplined feeling.”1
Adherence to the law is thus a possible mechanism of peace. However,
unfair laws also operate as the antithesis of peace and justice. That laws do not
exist in a vacuum, but rather as historically situated constructs is a revealing
point of departure. In my view, the criminal law allows an excellent
opportunity to gauge the success of the law in furthering justice. Specifically,
study of the criminal law allows for recognition and examination of
inconsistencies within the law together with the corresponding inquiry as to
why the law has operated and continues operating disparately for some.
Additionally, exploration of the criminal law demands consideration of
whether the goals of the law are equally attainable. In this regard, I am
respectful of Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s steadfast reliance on the
potential and value of legal doctrine, despite its racialized strategic deployment
to marginalize African-Americans. He once said:
[W]e are not wrong in what we are doing. If we are wrong, the Supreme Court
of this nation is wrong. If we are wrong, the Constitution of the United States
is wrong. If we are wrong, God Almighty is wrong. If we are wrong, Jesus of
Nazareth was merely a utopian dreamer that never came down to earth. If we
are wrong, justice is a lie. Love has no meaning. And we are determined here

* Assistant Professor, St. Louis University School of Law; LL.B. University of Ottawa, Canada;
LL.M Columbia Law School; JSD Candidate Columbia Law School. A special thank you to Will
Dailey for his able research assistance.
1. Felix Frankfurter, Between Us and Tyranny, TIME, Sept. 7, 1962, at 15.
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in Montgomery to work and fight until justice runs down like water and
righteousness like a mighty stream.2

This insistence that law be used in the most appropriate manner in which to
ensure justice is, perhaps, a naive insistence that those constructing the law be
honest in their motivations, biases, conflicts and investments. That the law
does not have an organic existence separate and apart from those that generate
it belies the constructedness of legal doctrine. Law’s imperfections reflect our
own. Accordingly, despite classical formulations of the scientific method,3 at
its core, law is a social science. It is a construct defined, nuanced and
manipulated within greater fora, which are also societal creations. In this way,
the legal profession maintains its monopoly over doctrine and its generation.
While my main goal in teaching Criminal Law is to ensure that my
students develop an understanding of the operation of criminal law doctrine, I
also seek, as part of my pedagogical approach, to reveal the constructedness of
doctrine, despite the fact that such revelation is often unsettling. Post-colonial
and post-modern scholars have acknowledged the tensions and potential
unraveling of the subject, or doctrine, once its human creation is acknowledged
and problematized.4 As scholars Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman have
stated:
If texts exist in what . . . one could call a dialectical relationship with their
social and historical context—produced by, but also productive of, particular
forms of knowledge, ideologies, power relations, institutions and practices—
then an analysis of the texts of imperialism has a particular urgency, given
their implication in far-reaching, and continuing, systems of domination and
economic exploitation.
This involves an understanding of present
circumstances as well as the ways in which these are informed by, perpetuate
and differ from situations which preceded them . . . .5

Accordingly, the terrain on which discourse like law operates necessitates an
appreciation of present circumstances as well as the ways in which
contemporary legal issues are informed by, perpetuate and differ from the past.
2. Martin Luther King, Jr., Speech at MIA (Montgomery Improvement Association) Mass
Meeting at Holt Street Baptist Church (Dec. 5, 1955), in 3 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR.: BIRTH OF A NEW AGE, DECEMBER 1955–DECEMBER 1956, at 73 (Clayborne Carson et
al. eds., 1997).
3. See BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 92-93 (14th ed. 1964).
See generally E. BRIGHT WILSON, JR., AN INTRODUCTION TO SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH (1952);
WILHGELM WINELBAND, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY (1958).
4. See generally BILL ASHCROFT ET AL., THE EMPIRE WRITES BACK: THEORY AND
PRACTICE IN POST-COLONIAL LITERATURES (1989); PAST THE LAST POST: THEORIZING POSTCOLONIALISM AND POST-MODERNISM (Ian Adam & Helen Tiffin eds., 1990); EDWARD W. SAID,
ORIENTALISM (1978); GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, THE POST-COLONIAL CRITIC:
INTERVIEWS, STRATEGIES, DIALOGUES (Sarah Harasym ed., 1990).
5. COLONIAL DISCOURSE AND POST-COLONIAL THEORY: A READER 4 (Patrick Williams &
Laura Chrisman eds., 1994) [hereinafter COLONIAL DISCOURSE].
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Law, like life, is experienced and interpreted through the prism of our
subjective realities. Our realities are informed by our identities and the
situatedness along multiple axes of existence. As scholars Vijay Mishra and
Bob Hodge have elaborated, because the subject is historical, this is the point
at which it is possible to connect post-colonial doctrine to the post-modern
subject. They write, “[i]f for postmodernism the object of analysis is the
subject as defined by humanism, with its essentialism and mistaken historical
verities, its unities and transcendental presence, then for post-colonialism the
object is the imperialist subject, the colonized as formed by the processes of
imperialism.”6
As a progressive Black female law professor in America,7 who cares
deeply about issues relating to the constructedness and ascription of identity,8 I
encounter and engage the law from a particular subject position.9 Accordingly,
to my mind, the law can never be neutral for the law never exists separate and
apart from society and the individuals of which it is composed. To situate law
within the post-colonial and post-modern is intuitive to me—to name it as such
is not.
Instead, for pedagogical purposes, I prefer to have the students reach their
own conclusions about the illusive neutrality of the law and our frail attempts
to remove ourselves and claim a disinterested position in the analysis of legal
opinions. I do not purport to deliver the TRUTH to my students. Instead, I
prefer that students contemplate how the ripples of the law, which we study
together, are consequences of undercurrents just beneath the surface of the law.
It is my hope that students engage with the undercurrents and reach their
conclusions about their salience. Of course, there is much beneath the surface

6. Vijay Mishra & Bob Hodge, What is Post(-)colonialism?, in COLONIAL DISCOURSE,
supra note 5, at 281.
7. In keeping with post-modern scholars’ insistence on the limitations of the universal, I
foreground my identity to highlight the conflict between our self-identification and simultaneous
constructedness—no position is neutral. Specifically, as a Jamaican-Canadian within the United
States of America, I am racialized as African-American. In Canada, I am othered as West Indian.
In Jamaica, I am interpreted alternatively as Kingstonian or “foreign.” Similarly, in the United
States, I am interpreted as progressive or liberal, while in Canada I am usually interpreted as
moderate to slightly left thereof. Context is everything.
8. I have described such externally defined identity elsewhere as “ascribed otherness.”
Ascribed otherness “delineate[s] the fact that there are consequences that flow from how we are
perceived and interpreted by the observer.” Camille A. Nelson, Breaking the Camel’s Back: A
Consideration of Mitigatory Criminal Defenses and Racism-Related Mental Illness, 9 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 77, 92 n.74 (2003). It describes the “process of interpretation . . . based not only on
one’s self-conceptualization and performance of identity, but on how others perceive one’s
identity and performance—this is the ‘what one is thought to be’ reference point.” Id.
9. For elaboration on subject-matter positionality as it impacts upon writing in the legal
academy, see CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE
CRIMINAL COURTROOM 4 (2003).
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of the law—politics, economics, history, and identity constructs are but a few
of the currents which, together with the depth of the record, the skill of the
advocacy and the quality of the briefs or pleadings impact upon the courts’
ability to craft just law.
For purposes of this essay, I will focus upon my attempts to have Criminal
Law students problematize the criminal law reasonable person. For illustrative
purposes, I will focus upon two areas in the criminal law, rape and selfdefense, in which the inconsistency, if not the irrationality, of the use of the
reasonable person reveals the undercurrents of negative associations of both
gender and racial identity constructs. Part II will briefly discuss the reasonable
person standard as it is used in the criminal law. Part III uses the People v.
Goetz10 case, the quintessential articulation of the reasonable person standard
in self-defense claims, as a counterpoint for analysis of the articulation of
reasonable fear. Part IV will focus the lens on the construction of fear in rape
cases as exemplified by State v. Alston,11 a leading case typically studied by
first-year law students.12 In conclusion, I explore the possibility that rules
flowing from these doctrines are incoherent, inconsistent and exactly the
opposite of what they should be. Indeed, the rules demonstrate the challenges
to alienated subjects constructed as “other” within the confines of a society that
is not so post-colonial after all.
By consistently exposing these types of inconsistencies in class, I
encourage the students to attempt a rationalization of the definition of fear in
rape cases with the definition of fear in self-defense. I ask that they query
whether there is more at work in the judicial decision-making processes of
these doctrines than was generated by zealous counsel. They often query the
role of perspective—we do not pretend that these decisions were made in a
vacuum and that the victim’s, defendant’s, judge’s or juror’s race, gender,
class, culture, religion or sexual orientation is irrelevant to the legal dispute.
Whatever the outcome of the students’ consideration, I hope to reveal that
behind the dichotomous treatment and incoherence lurks creativity, perspective
and power in the guise of precedential neutrality. Specifically, my pedagogical
10. 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986).
11. 312 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 1984).
12. I recognize that many schools or law professors choose not to teach rape in the first-year
law school curriculum for various reasons. I have decided to attempt a compromise of sorts—I
abandon my typical Socratic approach to the Criminal Law course and instead lecture through the
case law, statutes and Model Penal Code. Additionally, I do not include hypotheticals involving
sexual violence on the examinations. I will occasionally, however, ask an elemental multiple
choice question relating to a rape provision or to information conveyed on the subject matter by
guest speakers. See generally Kate E. Bloch, A Rape Law Pedagogy, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
307 (1995); Susan Estrich, Teaching Rape Law, 102 YALE L.J. 509, 510-11 (1992); Kevin C.
McMunigal, Reducing the Risks and Realizing the Rewards: An Approach to Teaching Rape Law,
34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 519 (1997); James J. Tomkovicz, On Teaching Rape: Reasons, Risks, and
Rewards, 102 YALE L.J. 481 (1992).
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orientation encourages doctrinal competence in addition to self-revelation of
the normative constructs driving legal decision-making and stare decisis.
II. THE REASONABLE PERSON IN BRIEF
Law reflects but in no sense determines the moral worth of a society. The
values of a reasonably just society will reflect themselves in a reasonably just
law. . . . The values of an unjust society will reflect themselves in an unjust
law.13

Many legal rules engage the hypothetical “reasonable person” as a
benchmark for judgment about the criminal culpability of an accused.14
Typically, if the reasonable person would have behaved as the accused did,
then the accused is worthy of mitigation or exoneration. The standard is
applied differently in the context of rape law, as the reasonable person standard
is geared to the behavior of the victim, not the accused.
It is important to consider the concept of the “reasonable person,” or what
used to be called the “ordinary man” and its antecedent the “reasonably
prudent man.” “Jurists have struggled for centuries to identify the ‘reasonable
person.’”15 The reasonable person has been articulated as that which
represents the best of us, as “an ideal, . . . the embodiment of all those qualities
which we demand of the good citizen.”16 Definitionally, the reasonable person
test prevents slippage of the objective standard into the realm of idiosyncrasy.
Rather, this objective test is designed in order to encourage some normative
baseline behavior. Some jurists have even articulated an aspirational tone for
such standards. Indeed, Chief Justice Lord Coleridge remarked in The Queen
v. Dudley and Stephens 17 that:

13. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 110-11 (1977) (paraphrasing Justice
Holmes).
14. Indeed, this standard is not simply relevant to criminal law, but is to be found throughout
legal discourse. In the realm of the criminal law, however, the reasonable person is the
foundational concept for criminal negligence assessments and features wherever there is an
objective test, i.e. provocation, self-defense, necessity, duress and rape doctrine, to name but a
few instances of its relevance.
15. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.04[D][2][d], at 131 (3d ed.
2001).
16. Id. § 10.04[D][2][d], at 131-32 (citing A.P. HERBERT, MISLEADING CASES IN THE
COMMON LAW 12 (1930)). Compare Nadine Klansky, Comment, Bernard Goetz, A ‘Reasonable
Man’: A Look at New York’s Justification Defense, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 1149, 1168 (1988). “The
truly reasonable man is that sort of perfect being whom one will be hardpressed ever to
encounter—let alone relate to. Clearly, no such animal exists who is capable of such flawless
restraint that the most seemingly provocative acts would be easily ignored and left unretaliated
against.” Id.
17. 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
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[w]e are often compelled to set up standards we cannot reach ourselves, and to
lay down rules which we could not ourselves satisfy. But a man has no right to
declare temptation to be an excuse, though he might himself have yielded to it,
nor allow compassion for the criminal to change or weaken in any manner the
legal definition of the crime.18

As social sensitivity to gender-equity progressed, this objective test was
renamed the “reasonable person.” However, when the legal term of art called
the “reasonable person” was initially introduced, it was still written about men,
by men.19 Thus, criticism of the objective standard centers on the charge that
the content and character of the “reasonable person” test has not changed and
is still, essentially, the reasonable White man in disguise. The application of
the reasonable person test has meant that those outside the original
contemplation of the objective test—the poor, women, racial and ethnic
minorities, lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgendered individuals—have been
evaluated against a standard that was not designed with them in mind and that
neither reflects their experiences, nor realities.20 Accordingly, the test has been
criticized as unable to respond to individual social realities and for
superimposing a notion of abstract equality where systemic inequality is the
norm.21
The necessity of subjectivizing the objective test has been recognized as in
the interest of justice.22 Accordingly, the defendant’s conduct is increasingly
to be compared to a subjectivized reflection of the accused that incorporates
mental and physical characteristics of the defendant, as well as relevant
personal life experiences.23 Inconsistent subjectivization, however, plagues the
use of this standard. As will be demonstrated below, often the construction of
the reasonable person is in conformity with prevailing social norms, even
biased norms. Therefore, the reasonable person takes on the hallmarks of
injustice by reflecting the very imperfections and idiosyncrasies against which

18. Id. at 288.
19. See, e.g., LEE, supra note 9, at 203-25; Toni Lester, The Reasonable Woman Test in
Sexual Harrassment Law—Will It Really Make a Difference?, 26 IND. L. REV. 227, 233 (1993);
Camille A. Nelson, (En)raged or (En)gaged: The Implications of Racial Context to the Canadian
Provocation Defence, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1007, 1025 (2002); Meri O. Triades, Student Article,
Finding a Hostile Work Environment: The Search for a Reasonable Reasonableness Standard, 8
WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANCESTRY L.J. 35 (2002).
20. Nelson, supra note 19, at 1025-26 (citing Joanne St. Lewis & Shelia Galloway,
Reforming the Defence of Provocation, in ONTARIO WOMEN’S DIRECTORATE 11-12 (1994)).
21. See Sue Bandalli, Provocation—A Cautionary Note, 22 J.L. & SOC’Y 398, 402-05
(1995); Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete? A
Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 435 (1981); Nelson,
supra note 19, at 1026 (citing ISABEL GRANT ET AL., THE LAW OF HOMICIDE § 6.2(b), at 6-12 to
6-14 (1994)).
22. DRESSLER, supra note 15, § 10.04[D][2][d], at 132.
23. Id.
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this objective standard was designed to mitigate. The examples used in this
essay, derived from the Goetz and Alston cases, demonstrate the inconsistent
analysis of reasonable fear in the doctrine of self-defense and rape. Such
dichotomous application of an objective test reveals the challenges posed by
societal constructions of race and gender as they are played out on the legal
terrain.
III. GOETZ AND BEYOND
Journalists, politicians, and other opinion leaders foster fears about particular
groups of people both by what they play up and what they play down.
Consider Americans’ fears of [B]lack men. These are perpetuated by the
excessive attention paid to dangers that a small percentage of AfricanAmerican men create for other people, and by a relative lack of attention to
dangers that a majority of [B]lack men face themselves.24

Every state in the United States recognizes self-defense against the use of
force, including deadly force for self-preservation.25 The elements of selfdefense entitle a non-aggressor to use “force upon another if he reasonably
believes that such force is necessary to protect himself from imminent use of
unlawful force” by the aggressor.26 “[H]owever, deadly force is only justified
in self-protection if the actor reasonably believes that its use is necessary to
prevent imminent and unlawful use of deadly force by the aggressor.”27
Additionally, there are often requirements that a person not use deadly force
against an aggressor if he knows that he has a safe avenue of retreat available.
It is important to note that there are three overarching overlays at work in
the doctrine. The first theme is that of necessity, which specifies that force
should not be used against an aggressor unless, and only to the extent, that
such force is necessary.28 The overlay of proportionality dictates that a person
is not justified in using force that is excessive in relation to the force
threatened. For instance, this theme would prevent the use of deadly force in
response to a non-deadly attack.29 The final overlay is particularly important
with regard to the Goetz case as it specifies that the need for self-defense must
originate from reasonable appearances, not subjective yet unreasonable
interpretations of reality.30 Accordingly, self-defense is unavailable to
defendants who respond with violence while laboring under an honest but

24. BARRY GLASSNER, THE CULTURE OF FEAR: WHY AMERICANS ARE AFRAID OF THE
WRONG THINGS 109 (1999).
25. DRESSLER, supra note 15, § 18.01[A], at 221.
26. Id. § 18.01[B], at 221 (emphasis added).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 18.01[C], at 222.
29. Id. § 18.01[D], at 222.
30. DRESSLER, supra note 15, § 18.01[E], at 222-23.
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unreasonable belief in the necessity for self-preservation. Equally important
for our analysis of Goetz is the first rule that an aggressor is disentitled from
claiming self-defense.31 Consideration of these criteria for the operation of a
valid claim of self-defense assists Criminal Law students in their assessment of
the following facts from the Court of Appeals of New York decision in People
v. Goetz.32
In the afternoon of December 22, 1984, Troy Canty, Darryl Cabey, James
Ramseur, and Barry Allen boarded an express subway train in the Bronx and
headed south towards Manhattan. The four youths rode together near the back
of the seventh subway car. Two of the four youths, Ramseur and Cabey, had
screwdrivers inside their coats, which they said were to be used to break into
video machine coin boxes.33
Bernhard Goetz boarded this subway train in Manhattan and took a seat
towards the rear of the same car occupied by the youths. Goetz was carrying
an unlicensed .38 caliber pistol with five rounds of ammunition in a waistband
holster. Canty approached Goetz, possibly with Allen beside him, and stated,
“give me five dollars.” Neither Canty nor any of the other youths displayed a
weapon. Goetz responded by standing up, pulling out his handgun and firing
four shots in rapid succession. The first shot hit Canty in the chest; the second
struck Allen in the back; the third went through Ramseur’s arm and into his
left side; the fourth was fired at Cabey, who was then standing in the corner of
the car, but missed, deflecting instead off of a wall of the conductor’s cab.
After surveying the scene around him, Goetz approached Cabey who was
sitting on the end bench of the car and said, “You seem to be [doing] all right;
here’s another,” and fired the last of five shots.34 The bullet entered the rear of
Cabey’s side and severed his spinal cord.35
All but two of the other passengers fled the car when the shots were fired
or immediately thereafter. The conductor, who had been in the next car, heard
the shots and instructed the motorman to radio for emergency assistance. The
31. As one author states:
The struggle between passion and reason in the law of self-defense is played out against a
background of shared, albeit vague, assumptions about the contours of the defense. First,
in order to be properly resisted, an attack must be imminent. Further, the defender’s
response must be both necessary and proportional to the feared attack. And finally, the
defender must act with the intention not of hurting the victim per se, but of thwarting the
attack. There is no statute or authoritative legal source that expresses this consensus, but
lawyers all over the world would readily concur that these are the basic, structural
elements of a valid claim of self-defense.
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL
19 (1988).
32. 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986).
33. Id. at 43.
34. See FLETCHER, supra note 31, at 1, 5.
35. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 43.
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conductor then went into the car where the shooting had taken place. He found
Goetz sitting on a bench, three injured youths lying bleeding on the floor, one
youth slumped against a seat, and two women passengers who had taken cover
also lying on the floor. Goetz told the conductor that the four youths had “tried
to rip him off.” While the conductor was aiding the youths, Goetz jumped
onto the tracks and fled. Ramseur and Canty, initially listed in critical
condition, fully recovered. Cabey was paralyzed and suffered some degree of
brain damage.36
The normative currency of racialized self-defense claims is revealed by
this case. Bernhard Goetz successfully claimed that his shooting of the four
Black youths on the New York subway was justified as an act of self-defense.
Deploying racialized imagery and playing on societal fears of Black men and
youth, defense attorney Barry Slotnick consistently constructed the Black
youths as racialized “others” who were deserving of the vigilante justice meted
out to them. His relentless use of stereotypical terminology such as “savages,”
“predators of society” and “vultures” was a successful tactic in ensuring
Goetz’s acquittal.37 Professor Armour, writing about Slotnick’s defense
tactics, writes:
In the end, Slotnick’s . . . covert appeal to racial fear may have had more
impact on the jury precisely because it remained hidden behind innuendo and
suggestion. It spoke to that side of jurors’ personality that they could not
confront directly. Paradoxically, Slotnick may have gained more from not
[explicitly playing on the racial factor] than from bringing the racial issue out
into the open. Openly talking about racial fear in the courtroom might have
helped the jury to deal more rationally with their own racial biases.38

Race norms tend to support claims of self-defense made by individuals
who have killed or injured men of color.39 In the realm of racialized selfdefense claims, as articulated largely by Whites against people of color, the
common tendency is to draw on prevailing social norms situating Black men,
in particular, as overly violent, dangerous and possessing super-human
strength. By stooping to the lowest common denominator—the stereotypical
construction of Black men and youth as problematic—the reasonable person
standard in the Goetz case is loaded with society’s historical baggage and
biases.40

36. Id. at 43-44.
37. FLETCHER, supra note 31, at 206-08 (describing the deployment of racial imagery and
the use of racial tactics by the defense to emphasize the racial identity of the four Black youths
shot by Bernhard Goetz).
38. JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS
OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 146 (1997) (citing FLETCHER, supra note 31, at 208).
39. CYNTHIA LEE, supra note 9, at 137-74.
40. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1270

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48:1261

In articulating the theory of “double-consciousness,” famous AfricanAmerican scholar-activist W.E.B. DuBois analyzed this very issue. At a time
when blaming the victim was explicit, racism in America was frequently
described as the “Negro problem.”41 This transference prompted DuBois to
ruminate, “How does it feel to be a problem?” He replied, “I answer seldom a
word. And yet, being a problem is a strange experience.”42 DuBois further
stated:
[T]he Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with secondsight in this American world,—a world which yields him no true selfconsciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other
world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double consciousness, this sense of
always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s
soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One
ever feels his two-ness,—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two
unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged
strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.43

Instead of the individual being the problem, being cast as the “other” in a
hostile or indifferent world is the problem, especially when this perception
becomes the norm and is deemed reasonable. Indeed, in overcoming the
doctrinal impediment to an aggressor successfully using self-defense and in
overcoming questions about proportionality and necessity (especially as they
relate to his shooting of Cabey who had himself retreated to the back of the
train), Bernhard Goetz was able to draw upon racialized norms which conflate
Black masculinity with violence.44 Such norms, which are both well-learned
and automatic, include the stereotype of the Black man as criminal, which
allows for the White accused to claim self-defense against alleged Black
aggressors more easily by articulating a normatively reasonable, though
racialized, basis for their fears.
In this way, the undercurrents of what Professor Jody Armour has termed
“reasonable racism” legitimates the objective standard of reasonableness.45
The Reasonable Racist believes that, even if his belief that Blacks are “prone
41. See W. E. BURGHARDT DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 15-17 (1953). See also
GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA, at lxix (1944) (arguing that the Negro problem had
become the American problem because of the deteriorating effects of racism upon the nation).
42. DUBOIS, supra note 41, at 15.
43. Id. at 16-17.
44. According to Goetz, the look in the eyes of the Black youth before him suggested evil
intentions. He stated:
I knew I had to pull the gun, but it was the look and now, you cannot understand this. It
was his eyes were shiny. He had a smile on his face. He’ll claim it was all a joke. If you
believe that, I will accept that. When I saw the, the smile on his face and the shine, and
the shine in his eyes, that he was enjoying this, I knew what they were going to do.
Klansky, supra note 16, at 1168 (citing the record).
45. ARMOUR, supra note 38, at 19-60.
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to violence” is based on prejudice, this is excusable as most Americans share
such racist views.46 Accordingly, the reasonable racist asserts that an
individual racist in a racist society cannot be condemned for expression of a
“human frailty as ubiquitous as racism.”47 Professor Cynthia Lee notes:
In this society, Black and Latino men are stereotyped as violent criminals,
gang members, and drug dealers. Because of these stereotypes, a man who
kills a Black or Latino male may be perceived as having acted reasonably in
self-defense even if he would be considered unreasonable had he killed a
White man under similar circumstances.
Less common, but equally
problematic, are claims of self-defense asserted by individuals who use deadly
force against unarmed Asian males in the mistaken belief that the victim knew
martial arts.48

Unlike the battered woman49 or the defendant asserting a cultural
defense,50 the claimant of racialized self-defense need not introduce expert
testimony to overcome societal (mis)perceptions or stereotypes. Instead, these
claimants rely upon and engage racialized societal norms to bolster their
claims. Presumably, this is because the racism of the racialized self-defense
claimant is “typical” and resonates with majoritarian notions of fear, response
and power. Even Professor Fletcher, in his seminal book on the Goetz case,
understands the power of the construction of fear—indeed, he himself conducts
his analysis within this constructed otherness when he states:
A mythical figure is born—an unlikely avenger for the fear that both unites
and levels all urban dwellers in the United States. . . . A common man had
emerged from the shadows of fear. He shot back when others only fantasize
their responses to shakedowns on the New York subways.
Like the Lone Ranger, the mysterious gunman subdues the criminals and
disappears into the night.51

The construction of fear situates Goetz as the victim. Note, however, that
the normative (mis)perceptions of fear do not similarly accrue to rape victims.
46. Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitor: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and
Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 787 (1994).
47. Id.
48. LEE, supra note 9, at 5-6.
49. See DR. LENORE WAKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979); DR. LENORE WAKER, THE
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (2d ed. 1984); State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989); State
v. Norman, 366 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984).
50. The cultural defense involves the invocation by criminal defendants or civil litigants of
elements of their cultural background that they feel a court ought to take into account to reach a
fair outcome. See ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, THE CULTURAL DEFENSE 5-7 (2004). Although
courts usually exclude such evidence, Renteln argues that the cultural defense must have a place
in the courtroom because “culture shapes the identity of individuals, influencing their reasoning,
perceptions, and behavior.” Id. at 10.
51. FLETCHER, supra note 31, at 2.
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Specifically, women who are victimized by sexual violence must counter
normative constructs of “willing victims,” “improper women” and generally
the notion that women “say no while meaning yes.” Additionally, according to
Alston, the fear experienced by women in situations of sexual violence is
neither pervasive nor normative—it is not general, abstract, contextual, neither
sociological nor experiential—it must be precise and generated instantaneously
with a discrete connection to the offense at issue.52 Unlike Mr. Goetz, a victim
of sexual violence cannot invoke the rhetoric of generalized or mythical fear
lacking a contemporaneous genesis. The test found in the following passage
from the Goetz opinion does not assist the rape victim, as she is not permitted
to consider the relevant knowledge she has about her assailant in articulating
the fear that prevented her resistance, nor is she permitted to ground her fear in
past experiences of sexual victimization:
[W]e have frequently noted that a determination of reasonableness must be
based on the “circumstances” facing a defendant or his “situation.” Such terms
encompass more than the physical movements of the potential assailant. . . .
[T]hese terms include any relevant knowledge the defendant had about that
person. They also necessarily bring in the physical attributes of all persons
involved, including the defendant.
Furthermore, the defendant’s
circumstances encompass any prior experiences he had which could provide a
reasonable basis for a belief that another person’s intentions were to injure or
rob him or that the use of deadly force was necessary under the
circumstances.53

This inconsistency merits contemplation in the forum of the Criminal Law
curriculum. The fear factor in cases of racialized self-defense has been
construed with great breadth. Specifically, Goetz was able to articulate widesweeping contextual, historical, even abstracted fears. Unlike the fear required
of a victim of rape, the reasonable fear of Bernhard Goetz was not discrete;
rather, he was able to draw upon his past experience of being mugged,
presumably by other young Black men.54 To be legitimated as reasonable,
Goetz’s fear did not even have to find its genesis in the specific behaviors of
the youths involved. Rather, as legal theorist Professor Jody Armour has
stated, Goetz was able to draw upon stereotypical racial imagery which
automatically (re)activates biased views of the Black youths. He writes:

52. State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 1984). See infra notes 57-97 and accompanying
text.
53. People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 52 (N.Y. 1986) (emphasis added).
54. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 10.4 n.28 (2d ed. 2003): “‘he
was certain that none of the youths had a gun, he had a fear based on prior experience, of being
“maimed,”’ he would be allowed to introduce into evidence ‘any prior experiences he had which
could provide a reasonable basis for [such] belief,’ e.g., that a few years earlier he had been
injured in a mugging.”
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This activation renders negative thoughts and feelings associated with that
stereotype acutely accessible for social judgments about the Black victims.
The decision makers may not experience these judgments as stemming from
their knowledge of the Black stereotype, but instead as rational evenhanded
evaluations of objective reality.55

Equally telling for the inconsistencies forming the focus of this essay, unlike
the rape victim, claimants of racialized self-defense may successfully articulate
a comprehensive framework for their fear so as to justify their claims for selfdefense. Such racialized fear, accordingly, can stem from familiarity with a
“certain type” or the alleged fact that a previous encounter with a “similar type
of person” generated reasonable fears.56
IV. THE CONSTRUCTION OF FEAR IN RAPE DOCTRINE
One commentator has described rape as an “act of terrorism” that keeps
women dependent on men.57 I would add that rape is an act of violence that
keeps women in their place and in fear of men. There has been much concern
for the continuing role of the history of rape law as it impacts modern day
articulation of the doctrine.
Crenshaw criticizes the explanation of the origin of rape laws as protecting
chastity as being “an oversimplified . . . and . . . inadequate account” because
such an explanation speaks only to white women. This point is well taken
because it cautions us to look closely at how the various forms of sexual
domination are played out in different types of interracial and status
relationships. Chastity may be the prevailing rationale in [a] relationship []
where there is the transmission of property rights whereas in those
relationships where the female herself is seen as an object of property having
value, protection of one’s property rights may be the dominant rationale. But
when the female is neither the vessel for transmitting property rights nor the
object of those rights, sexual assault lays bare the basic issue of male
domination and usurpation of control over one’s sexuality. This is the case
whether or not one is a female of color or not.58

55. ARMOUR, supra note 38, at 145-46.
56. LEE, supra note 9, at 137-54.
57. See Deirdre Davis, The Harm That Has No Name: Street Harassment, Embodiment, and
African American Women, 4 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 133, 140 (1994).
58. Susan McCoin, Law and Sex Status: Implementing the Concept of Sexual Property, 19
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 237, 242 n.74 (1998) (quoting Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist
Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 157 (1989)). See also Renée L.
Jarusinsky, Gender Difference in Perceiving Violence and Its Implication for the VAWA’s Civil
Rights Remedy, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 965, 982 (2000) (focusing on the origins of rape law as
originating from the concept of women as property of men: “Because wives became property of
their husbands upon marriage, British common law allowed husbands to discipline their wives,
but ‘only blows with a switch no wider than a man’s thumb were allowed.’ This rule came to be
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Blackstone defined rape as “carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and
against her will.”59 Typically, rape is defined as sexual intercourse achieved
“forcibly,” “against the will” of the female, or “without her consent.”60 Some
penal provisions contain all three phrases.61 Thus, in general, sexual
intercourse by a male with a female, who is not his wife, constitutes rape if it is
committed: (1) forcibly; (2) by means of certain forms of deception; (3) while
the victim is unconscious or asleep; or (4) under circumstances in which the
victim is incompetent, for example by reason of age or mental incapacity, to
give consent.62
Focusing on forcible rape, a successful prosecution requires proof that the
female did not consent to the intercourse and that the sexual act was “by force”
or “against her will.” Thus, it has been held that where there is a lack of
consent, but no showing of force, a forcible rape conviction is inappropriate.63
The definition of “forcible” will be the focus of this section as nonconsensual
intercourse is “forcible” if the male uses or threatens to use force likely to
cause bodily harm to the female64 or, in some cases, a third person.65
Generally, intercourse secured by non-physical threats does not constitute
forcible rape.
An inconsistency arises when considering the objective standard at the
point at which non-consent and force merge. The defendant’s use of force, or
his threats of force, relates both to the victim’s non-consent and to the
overcoming of her will. Accordingly, a conviction of forcible rape can only be
secured where the victim either resisted the defendant’s sexual aggression and
such resistance was overcome by force, or where the victim was prevented
from resisting by threats to her safety.66
The victim, therefore, “must follow the natural instinct of every proud
female67 to resist” the attacker to the “utmost,”68 unless she is prevented from

known as the ‘rule of thumb.’ The ‘rule of thumb’ and a husband’s right to discipline his wife
were also recognized in the United States.”).
59. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *210 (1769).
Carnal knowledge is sexual intercourse. Sexual penetration by the penis of the vulva is necessary
to constitute rape. 1 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 628 (1847).
60. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1267 (7th ed. 1999).
61. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 462 (1988).
62. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1985); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 1999).
63. State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 1984) (forcible rape conviction overturned,
notwithstanding that the victim did not consent to the intercourse); Commonwealth v. Berkowitz,
641 A.2d 1161, 1164 (Pa. 1994).
64. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 note on status of section (Proposed Official Draft
1962).
65. Fitzpatrick v. State, 558 P.2d 630, 631 (Nev. 1977).
66. Hazel v. State, 157 A.2d 922, 925 (Md. 1960).
67. State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720, 733 (Md. 1981) (Cole, J., dissenting).
68. People v. Dohring, 59 N.Y. 374, 383 (1874).
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doing so by serious threats to her safety. Fear, in a rape case, is not a general
fear of the perpetrator; rather, it is fear of death or serious bodily harm
generated by the actions of the rapist at the time of the violence.69
Despite the fact that the nonconsensual rape was itself an act of violence,
courts routinely demanded further physical manifestations of violence in order
for a victim to overcome skepticism about whether she actually consented.70
In the absence of additional physical violence, courts also accepted that threats
of such conduct would be sufficient to overcome the will to resist.71
Accordingly, a rape victim could articulate a genuine fear of further battery, an
assault, as evidencing her lack of consent. This threshold question of fear of
force or further violence, however, has been narrowly confined by some courts
as requiring an a-contextual, a-historical nexus only to the violent incident at
issue in the trial.72
Typically, for a forcible rape conviction to be upheld on the basis of
“threat of force,” as distinguished from actual force, the prosecution cannot
rely on the victim’s subjective fear of serious bodily harm. The subjective
emotion of fear must be externally legitimized by an assessment of the threat,
either physical or verbal, on an objective basis. Thus, the fear versus threat
distinction in rape cases requires a two-tiered inquiry—first, what was the
victim’s subjective assessment and apprehension; and second, it is required
that the accused undertook some conduct which placed the victim in a state
where she had reasonable apprehension for her safety—hence, the rape victim
must pass a threshold assessment of the legitimacy of her fear in the
circumstances of impending sexual violence.73
Note the focus on the victim. Like the doctrine for self-defense, the lens of
the law is focused upon the victim, not the perpetrator. This curiosity might
play a significant role in the inconsistent development of the law. The rape
law resistance requirement imposes conflicting imperatives upon the victim.
In order to ensure a subsequent successful prosecution, the victim, not the
perpetrator, must conform to certain objective standards. Either she must act
in a manner that demonstrates her lack of consent by performing resistance in
such a way that it is cognizable to the court, or she must be prevented from
physical resistance by objectively determined fear. Accordingly, “nonconsent

69. King v. State, 357 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Tenn. 1962).
70. Id. at 46; Rusk, 424 A.2d 720.
71. State v. Burns, 214 S.E.2d 56 (N.C. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 933 (1975); State v.
Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470, 476 (N.C. 1984).
72. Alston, 312 S.E.2d at 476. See also Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1111-12
(1986).
73. People v. Iniguez, 872 P.2d 1183, 1188 (Cal. 1994); Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641
A.2d 1161, 1164 (Pa. 1994). However, a forcible rape prosecution is appropriate, even if the
victim’s fears are unreasonable, if the accused knowingly takes advantage of her fear in order to
accomplish sexual intercourse. See Iniguez, 872 P.2d at 1188.
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and force are not synonymous.”74 With such law, saying “no” is insufficient,
as it does not rise to the level of physicality required for resistance. Moreover,
the male perpetrator must use or threaten force on the present occasion to an
extent that would cause a reasonable person to fear grievous injury if she were
to resist sexual intercourse.75
Given this doctrine, who is the reasonable person experiencing the fear? If
subjectivization of the objective standard were at work to the same extent as in
the Goetz76 case, the reasonable person would be a similarly situated woman.
Had the reasonable woman standard been operative in Alston,77 the outcome
would likely have been different.
Furthermore, if the race of the victim in Alston were different, we might
well have different law from this leading case. Specifically, there are several
factors that lead to a reasonably informed hypothesis that both the perpetrator
and the victim in Alston were Black. First, if the colloquialisms78 referenced
by the court are any indicator, this was a case of Black-on-Black violence,
which is often treated with less seriousness than Black-on-White violence.79
Indeed, in cases of alleged rape, the race of both the victim and the perpetrator
have historically been important to the outcome. As such, the second racial
factor indicating the under-consideration of sexual violence in Alston is the fact
that historically the harshest penalties in rape law have been reserved for Black
men accused of raping White women.80 Additionally, African-American

74. DRESSLER, supra note 15, § 33.04[B][1][c], at 580.
75. Id.
76. 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986). See supra notes 24-56 and accompanying text.
77. 312 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 1984). See infra and supra notes 57-97 and accompanying text.
78. Alston complained to Cottie Brown, the victim, that she had been “dogging” him and
making him seem a fool. Alston also threatened Cottie Brown that he was going to “fix” her face
so that her mother “could see he was not playing.” State v. Alston, 312 S.E. 2d 470, 472 (N.C.
1984).
79. “African Americans are significantly more likely to be the victims of major crimes than
whites. . . . [T]raditionally African American communities have not been plagued by too much
police presence but too little: for long stretches of American history, white-dominated law
enforcement organizations were altogether uninterested in investigating black-on-black crime.”
Angela P. Harris, Criminal Justice as Environmental Justice, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1, 19-20
(1997).
80. As Joshua Dressler points out in his casebook, “[i]t is difficult to understate the role of
racism in the history of rape prosecutions. If sexism has resulted in the creation of ‘boys’ rules,’
racism has resulted in ‘whites’ rules’ in the enforcement and punishment of rape laws.” JOSHUA
DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 379 n.1 (3d ed. 2001). Furthermore,
Susan Estrich states:
The death penalty for rape in this country, now unconstitutional under Coker v. Georgia,
was traditionally reserved for black men who raped white women. Between 1930 and
1967, 89% of the men executed for rape in this country were black. That figure includes
36% of the black men who were convicted of raping a white woman; only 2% of the
defendants convicted of rape involving any other racial combination were executed.
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women are disproportionately represented among victims of rape.81
Furthermore, perpetrators typically rape women of the same race.82 Lastly,
stereotypes of Black female sexuality operate against Black women who are
stereotypically constructed a hyper-sexualized other.83
Alston84 is a case in point. Evidence was presented to show that Alston
and the victim, Cottie Brown, had been involved in an abusive relationship
prior to the rape. They had lived together and, on occasion, Brown would
acquiesce to sexual relations “just to accommodate” Alston’s violent
demands.85 On those occasions, the victim testified “[she] would stand still
and remain entirely passive while [the accused] undressed her and had
intercourse with her.”86
At the time of the rape, however, they no longer lived together and the
victim wanted to end the relationship but was afraid to tell Alston. On the day
of the rape, Alston grabbed the victim in a parking lot and threatened to “fix
her face so that her mother could see he was not playing.”87 When the victim
agreed to walk with him if he let go, Alston did so. The two of them walked
along the street as Alston spoke of their relationship. They arrived at a house
belonging to Lawrence Taylor,88 a friend of Alston’s, where they had had sex
in the past. Inside, after additional conversation, Alston asked the victim if she
was “ready.” The victim told him that she did not want to have sex with him,

Professor Wolfgang, after a systemic analysis of 1,238 rape convictions between 1945 and
1965, concluded that race was the only factor that accounted for the disparities in the
imposition of the death penalty. Although the death penalty for rape is now prohibited, at
least one study has found that black men convicted of raping white women continue to
receive the harshest penalties.
Estrich, supra note 72, at 1184 n.2 (citations omitted).
81. See ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 78 (1999).
82. See CALLIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
SPECIAL REPORT, VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION AND RACE, 1993-98, at 10 (2001),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/vvr98.pdf.
83. See JUAN F. PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE
AMERICA (2000), for information on stereotypical depictions of Black woman as hyper-sexed.
See also BELL HOOKS, BLACK LOOKS: RACE AND REPRESENTATION (1992); PATRICIA HILL
COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT (2d ed. 2000).
84. State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 1984).
85. See DRESSLER, supra note 15, § 33.04[B][1][c], at 579.
86. Alston, 312 S.E.2d at 471.
87. Id. at 472.
88. Because of Taylor’s race and reputation on campus, it is further likely that Alston is
African-American. Given the segregated society in which we live, it is probable that Alston and
Taylor are both Black. Further, if Lawrence Taylor is the (in)famous “LT,” he was a soon to be
professional football player and any friend of his, who had just come to his house to have sex
with an ex-girlfriend, was also likely “a big man on campus”-type such that Cottie Brown likely
knew he would have his way given her relative powerlessness in the realm of sport, sex, gender,
hierarchy and power.
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but when Alston told her to lie down on a bed, she complied, after which
Alston pushed her legs apart and had intercourse.89
At trial, Alston was convicted of forcible rape, but the appellate court
overturned the conviction. It held that while there was sufficient evidence that
the victim had not consented to the intercourse, there was no evidence that
Alston “used force or threats to overcome the will of the victim to resist the
sexual intercourse.”90 Accordingly, neither the victim’s historically informed
contemporary general fear of Alston, nor his specific threats of force not
linked directly to the demand for sexual intercourse on the present occasion,
could support a forcible rape conviction. As Professor Joshua Dressler
comments:
[I]n a remarkable “example of narrow time-framing and psychological
naivete,” the court discounted [the victim]’s reasonable fear of [the defendant]
that was based on his prior use of force, and even ignored his specific threat to
“fix” her face because it was not linked directly to a demand for sexual
intercourse on the present occasion.91

Thus, in order to support a rape conviction, the victim will be assessed
upon her reasonable apprehension of grievous harm. In order for this
apprehension to be reasonable, the victim’s fear cannot find its genesis in prior
acts of violence or abuse unrelated to the demand for sex. There must be an ahistorical nexus between the fear factor and the threatened harm such that
generalized, contextual, or societal bases for fears of sexual violence are
discounted, despite the unfortunate statistics indicating the prevalence of such
violence, especially against women.92 Hence, in the Alston case, the accused’s
prior abusive behavior, his prior extractions of forced sex and his prior threats,
on the same day, to “fix” the victim’s face “so that her mother [would know]
he was not playing,” were too remote, too disconnected from the subsequent
demand for sex so as to disprove the victim’s claims that her will was
overcome. To cause a reasonable fear, meaning fear that overcomes the will of
the victim by creating an apprehension of grievous harm if the victim were to
resist, the rapist will be assessed upon his use or threats of force at the instant
of the sexual violation. Altson states:
The evidence in the present case tended to show that, shortly after the
defendant met Brown at the school, they walked out of the parking lot with the
89. Alston, 312 S.E.2d at 472-73.
90. Id. at 476 (emphasis added).
91. DRESSLER, supra note 15, § 33.04[B][1][c], at 579.
92. See DRESSLER, supra note 80, at 374-78. According to the Violence Against Women
Survey conducted by the Department of Justice, one in six U.S. women has been a victim of a
completed or attempted rape. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 13 (2000),
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/183781.pdf.
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defendant in front. He stopped and told Brown he was going to “fix” her face
so that her mother could see he was not “playing.” This threat by the
defendant and his act of grabbing Brown by the arm at the school, although
they may have induced fear, appeared to have been unrelated to the act of
sexual intercourse between Brown and the defendant. More important, the
record is devoid of evidence that Brown was in any way intimidated into
having sexual intercourse with the defendant by that threat or any other act of
the defendant on June 15. . . .
. . . Although Brown’s general fear of the defendant may have been
justified by his conduct on prior occasions, absent evidence that the defendant
used force or threats to overcome the will of the victim to resist the sexual
intercourse alleged to have been rape, such general fear was not sufficient to
show that the defendant used the force required to support a conviction of
rape.93

Given the understanding of Goetz’s reasonable, contextualized and
historically motivated fears, I ask the students why the court would not
similarly subjectivize the fears of Cottie Brown. We consider the likelihood of
a court adopting a reasonable sexual assault victim standard, a reasonable
abused woman standard, or simply a reasonable woman standard in the
circumstances. Such a re-formulation might take into account the reality of
violence against women, or at least inform the objective reasonable person
standard about the history of the rape victim in question. Many students
express their doubts about the adoption of such standards as non-idiosyncratic
and therefore as workable within the confines of the objective test.
Accordingly, rape law doctrine is driven by dominant societal norms in a
way that does not accrue to the benefit of the victim of sexual violence. While
racialized self-defense claimants use dominant social mores, however
stereotypical, to bolster the likelihood of exoneration, women violated by
rape94 must counter stereotypical assumptions around both the issue of consent
and fear.
An examination of the limited conceptualization of fear in traditional rape
cases reveals a narrow conceptualization of the violent circumstances, and the
93. Alston, 312 S.E.2d at 476 (some emphasis added).
94. I recognize that men are also victims of sexual violence, both from women and men. In
another forthcoming article, The Construction of Fear: Race, Rape and Jack in the Box, I delve
further into the intersection of gender, sexual-orientation, and sexuality to analyze societal underconsideration of male-male rape, and the societal norms compelling under-reporting of femalemale sexual violence. Additionally, the prison context is an area particularly under-explored
given the prevalence of sexual violence both against male and female inmates. See Zachary R.
Dowdy, Prison Sued in “Sex Slave” Case: Inmate Says Gangs Used Him as “Chattel,”
NEWSDAY, Apr. 30, 2002, at A37. (Black man alleges that guards and prison officials in the
Texas prison where he was imprisoned for bouncing a check ignored his allegations that he was
being repeatedly raped by inmates who traded him as part of slave ring in operation by prison
gangs.)
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gendered context confronting, the victim in question and women in general.
At the other extreme, the breadth and scope of the concept of fear accepted by
grand juries and courts in their considerations of cases where claims of
racialized self-defense are made is so profound as to allow for abstractions
well beyond the situation confronting the accused involved in a controversial
killing. Susan Estrich acknowledged this dichotomy in her excellent article,
Rape, in which she writes:
The courts’ unwillingness to credit the victim’s past experience of violence at
the hands of the defendant stands in sharp contrast to the black letter law that a
defendant’s knowledge of his attacker’s reputation for violence or ownership
of a gun is relevant to the reasonableness of his use of deadly force in selfdefense.
That these decisions depart so straightforwardly from established criminal
law doctrine is noteworthy but not unusual in the law of rape.95

Accordingly, Alston is consistent with doctrine that has for centuries
regulated the sexual autonomy of women for the benefit of men. It is also
consistent with jurisprudence that prefers some victims to others and that
minimizes violence by Blacks against Blacks. The decision in Alston further
underscores the reality facing many women—sexual violence and predation is
often a fact of life. Accordingly, many quite reasonable women live in fear of
such violence. Unlike the fear factor in Goetz, such fear is not founded upon
stereotypical assessments, biases or prejudice against men. Rather, the fear of
a reasonable woman is based in the reality of sexual abuse of women that is
often inflicted from an early age. In the case of Cottie Brown, this was
certainly not an abstraction, but her history with the perpetrator himself was
the basis for her fear.
Alston reveals that prior instances of domestic and sexual violence or fear
derived from the societal treatment of women might not inform the judge or
jury of the fear the woman felt in the particular case before the court.
Additionally, a prior history of violence with another man might not be
relevant to the woman’s fear at the moment of the rape. Per Alston, even a
prior history of violence with the accused may be seen as uninformative to the
fear factor in considering whether the victim’s will was overcome. I agree
with the following articulations of Professor Estrich in condemning the
analysis of fear that the Alston court was so willing to conduct in a vacuum:
[I]t is not at all difficult to understand that a woman who had been repeatedly
beaten, who had been a passive victim of both violence and sex during the
“consensual” relationship, who had sought to escape from the man, who is
confronted and threatened by him, who summons the courage to tell him their
relationship is over only to be answered by his assertion of a “right” to sex—a

95. Estrich, supra note 72, at 1111.
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woman in such a position would not fight. She wouldn’t fight; she might
cry. . . . Hers is the reaction of people who have already been beaten, or who
never had the power to fight in the first instance. Hers is, from my reading, the
most common reaction of women to rape.96

While the students might not know it, and indeed some would recoil if they
did, they mature in their appreciation of feminist legal theory and postmodern
critical race theory as mechanisms for social change. In particular, the critique
of objectivity of many “crit” scholars, feminists and critical race theorists in
particular, is often empowering to students who sit in class stupefied by the
seeming injustice of some judicial outcomes.97 Many, both men and women,
of all races, sense that some of the outcomes of these criminal cases are
intuitively unfair or difficult to reconcile. However, until we delve into the
language of the objective reasonable person, they lack the legalese to ground
their sense of equity or concern for consistency.
By struggling with these inconsistencies, many students gain considerable
insights into the forces that reproduce bias in the legal system. In attempting to
reconcile the inconsistent formulations and outcomes of legal tests across
various doctrines, fear in the criminal law being just one example, students,
often for the first time, see how the law is simultaneously one of the most
powerful catalysts for societal change and how the law has contributed to the
construction of societal inequity. At the very least, those resistant to such
critiques recognize the basis upon which such criticisms could be made.
V. CONCLUSION
Both feminist legal theory and post-modern race theory reveal that
constructions of gender, race, and the nexus of both, have permeated legal
thought on multiple levels. Not only is doctrine affected, so too are legal
discourse and basic structures of legal institutions. Noted feminist legal
theorist Martha Chamallas has stated that, “[i]n a variety of contexts, legal
feminists have demonstrated that gender is often inseparable from hierarchy—
that ‘male’ functions as a code word for superior, while ‘female’ still carries
associations of inferiority.”98 This insight also has a race dynamic—as is
demonstrated by the dichotomies of the criminal law—the hierarchy reflects
White male superiority and the consequent devaluation of racialized women.99
Indeed, if my speculations about the Alston case are correct, then Black

96. Id.
97. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 317 (2d ed.
2003) (describing the impact of gender on the law).
98. Id.
99. See generally State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 1984); People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d
41 (N.Y. 1986); DRESSLER, supra note 80, at 51-53, 374-78.
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feminist Angela Harris’ assertions about the intersectional experience of Black
women who are victims of rape is profoundly accurate.
Professor Harris asserts that the selective focus of rape laws poses a
distinctive hardship for Black women who mistrust the law’s racism and never
benefit from the racialized prototype of White womanhood when they are
victimized by Black men.100 Black women have been stereotyped as naturally
promiscuous101 and have been denied even the nominal legal protections
afforded to White women. Disentangling the gender dynamic reveals a further
racialized construct, as Black men accused of raping White women have
historically received greater sentences than have White men accused of the
same crime. Further, Black men falsely accused of raping White women have
been victimized, for instance by lynching, as “[W]hite men maintained their
control over the bodies of all [B]lack people.”102
The casebook that I use for Criminal Law, Joshua Dressler’s Cases and
Materials on Criminal Law, has much of this critical information buttressing
the case law and statutory provisions. As students of the law, together we
examine the cases and commentary and try to make sense of it all—trouble is,
in the absence of the critique, explication, commentary and investigation, the
law may actually make little sense. The one thing that is consistent with much
of the criminal law is its inconsistency. I highlight this fact by supplementing
the materials with contemporary legal issues with which the students might be
familiar from the media. Long after the course is over, some students continue
to forward and critique controversial criminal law matters they come across.
To me, this is success, for it seems the longer we continue to engage with the
subject and continue our study of the criminal law, the more we are conscious
of its construction as a site which reflects our own inconsistencies and perhaps
even our idiosyncrasies.
Such critical self-reflection is a task too often avoided in the interests of
supposed neutrality. Situating myself within the American legal academy has
allowed me the ability to explore and analyze legal doctrine without the
baggage of self-serving claims of objectivity. Starting from the position that
law is created allows an exciting foray into the law that is as informative and
demystifying as it is empowering. Such a starting point allows for the
relevance of perspective to be openly discussed in the classroom, not as nonlegal, emotional, soft considerations, but rather as important policy
considerations which inform our appreciation of the law and allow for an
100. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 581, 601 (1990).
101. See Sharon Angella Allard, Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome: A Black Feminist
Perspective, 1 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 191, 196-97 (1991); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring
the Sexualizations of Race: Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47
BUFF. L. REV. 1, 84-85 (1999).
102. Harris, supra note 100, at 600.
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enriched experience. Indeed, to think like a lawyer in this new millennium
may demand such a critically informed framework for analysis.
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